| TRACK: | National Security |
| TITLE: | Biosecurity Challenges in the Post 9-11 World |
| DATE: | Saturday, February 18, 2006 |
| TIME: | 9:45 AM - 11:15 AM |
| ORGANIZERS: | Elisa D. Harris, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland |
| PARTICIPANTS: * = invited, not yet confirmed. |
| Elisa D. Harris (Moderator), Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland | Ronald Atlas (Speaker), University of Louisville Globalizing Biosecurity | Michael Imperiale (Speaker), University of Michigan The Role of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity | Ottorino Cosivi (Speaker), World Health Organization Implications of Life Sciences Research and Development for Global Health Security | John Steinbruner (Speaker), Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland Protective Management of Biotechnology |
| AVAILABLE ABSTRACTS: |
| No available abstracts. |
| SYNOPSIS: |
| Fear of bioterrorism is a top concern of U.S. security policy, but a source of danger involving modern biology has been largely overlooked: the possibility that legitimate biotechnology research in academic, government, or industry laboratories could be misused either deliberately or inadvertently to make current pathogens more lethal or to create new pathogens that are more dangerous. Research with potentially destructive applications is being carried out in laboratories worldwide. Recent examples of such dual-use research include the mousepox experiment in Australia and the poliovirus experiment in the United States. A diverse panel of scientists and policy experts will explore both the nature of the dual-use problem and potential measures to mitigate the threat. Questions to be addressed include: Is it possible to define potentially dangerous research? What role should the scientific community, national governments, and international bodies play? What types of policy tools are available, and how effective are they likely to be? How can we reduce the risks from dual-use research without impinging upon scientific progress? |
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